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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
HARRIET E. RIPPE.N,TROP,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Oase No.

9896

MINNIE G. PICKERING,
Defendam,t .and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPOND·ENT
The parties will be referred to as in the case below.

ST.A:TEMENT OF THE KIND OF C.AJSE
Plaintiff seeks to establish a right of way over defendant's property claiming .an adverse user for a period
of more than twenty years (Pretrial Order, R. 14).

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the close of plaintiff's case defendant moved
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for a dismissal (R. 86-87). The motion was provisionally
denied (R. 88). At the close of all of the evidence both
plaintiff .and defendant moved for a directed verdict.
The court thereupon granted defendant's original motion
of dismissal and discharged the jury (R. 132). Findings
of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment of dismissal
were thereafter duly made .and entered (R. 17-21).
RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL
Defendant, the respondent, defends the action of
the court below, which appellant, the plaintiff, seeks to
reverse.
Appellant's statement of facts does not present the
true setting of the case and in certain instances, hereinafter to be pointed out, is in direct conflict with the proceedings in the court below. We are impelled to restate
the position of the parties.
Mrs. Rippentrop is purchasing from Keren Skidmore Wilde under a uniform real estate contract dated
October 6, 1959 (Ex. 15 P) property located at 241 South
Ninth East Street in Salt Lake City, described .as follows:
Commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 4,
Block 43, Plat "B", Salt Lake City Survey, and
running thence South 261,4 feet; thence East 71!2
rods; thence North 261,4 feet; thence West 7¥2
rods to the place of beginning.
Mrs. Pickering and Irene B. Schlegel are joint tenants in the ownership of the property immediately to
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the South at what is commonly known as 251 South Ninth
East Street, Salt Lake City, and particularly described
as follows:
Beginning at a point 26.25 feet South from the
Northwest corner of Lot 4, Block 43, Plat "B",
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thewce South
41.25 feet; thence East 123. 75· feet; thence North
41.25 feet; thence West 123.75 feet to the point
of beginning. (Entry 34, Abstract of title, Ex.

16D').
Samuel R. Skidmore was the common owner, having
acquired the larger tract by deed recorded June 6, 1882
(Entry 3, Abstract of Title, Ex. 3 P). The North 25
feet were conveyed by Samuel R. Skidmore to S. Randolph Skidmore by deed recorded June 24, 1892 (Entry
5, Abstract of Title, Er. 3 P), the description of the
property being as follows :
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Lot 4 Block
43 Plat "B" Salt Lake City Survey, thence East
TY2 rods, thence South 25 feet, thence West 7¥2
rods, thence North 25 feet to the place of beginning.
Samuel R. Skidmore conveyed the South 411~ feet,
the property now owned by Minnie G. Pickering and
Irene P. S.chlegel, to Mrs. May Pickering by deed dated
September 23, 1909 (Entry 8, Abstract of Title, Ex. 16
D). On the same day, September 23, 1909, Samuel R.
Skidmore conveyed the strip of land 114 feet in width
between the two properties as above described to S.
Randolph Skidmore by warranty deed (Entry 17, Abstract of Title, Ex. 3 P), thus accounting for the frontage
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of 261_4 feet on the Rippentrop side of the title and making that property immediately adjacent and contiguous
to the North line of the Pickering property which otherwise would have been separated by a strip of land 114
feet in width. The description reads:

Be:gi11fflling at a point 25 feet South of the Northwest corner of Lot 4, Block 43, Plat "B", Salt
Lake City Survey, running thence South 11;4, feet;
thence East 71h rods; thence North 114 feet;
thence West 71j2 rods to the place of beginning.
Exhibit 17 D shows the eaves of the Rippentrop
residence to extend out approximately 11,4 feet on the
South side next to the Pickering property. The deed
conveying the 114 feet strip takes care of the encroachment of the eaves over the property conveyed to Mrs.
May PiGkering on the same day. The home now owned
by Minnie G. Pickering and Irene P. Schlegel was constructed in 1913 (R. 34). The home now claimed by
Mrs. Rippentrop was constructed before 1893 (R. 33).
Mrs. May Pickering, the first wife of Alexander
Pickering, was a daughter of her grantor, Samuel R.
Skidmore. Mrs. Wilde was born in the home of her
father, S. Randolph Skidmore in 1893 (R. 33) and resided in the family home at 241 South Ninth East until
September of 1924 (R. 62), but her parents, Mr. and Mrs.
S. Randolph 8kidmore continued to reside there until
1946 (R. 37). In the meantime May Skidmore was occupying the house next door with her husband Alexander
Pickering and she remained there at least through 1925
(R. 63).
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The abstract of title covering the Rippentrop property (Ex. 3 P) discloses that Samuel Randloph S!kidmore, also :lrnown asS. Randolph Skidmore, remained the
owner of the so-called Rippentrop property until his
death on October 19, 1956. The decree of distribution
dated June 12, 1957, and recorded the next day, distributes the property in undivided interests to Leslie R.
Skidmore, son, and Keren Skidmore Wilde, daughter
(Entry 25-28, Abstract of Title, Ex. 3 P). On June 18,
1957, Leslie R. Skidmore conveyed the property to his
sister, Keren Skidmore Wilde, who remains the owner
of the property subject to the uniform real estate contract in favor of Mrs. Rippentrop (Entry 29, Abstract
of Title, Ex. 3 P).
The decree of distribution in the estate of S. Randolph Skidmore, in distributing the property now being
purchased by Mrs. Rippentrop, makes no refe·rence to
the ·alleyway which, as shown by the surveyor's plat Exhibit 17 D, is wholly on the Pickering and Schlegel property with a distance of 1.5 feet between the brick house
claimed by Mrs. Rippentrop and the North line of the
Pickering et al. property. On the West there is a distance of a fraction of a foot (0.1) and on the East another fraction of a foot (0.4) between defendant's property and the overhanging eaves on the Rippentrop home.
The driveway is approximately 10 feet 4 inches in width
between the two houses (R. 72) which leaves defendant
with .approximately 31 feet out of the total frontage of
4114 feet for her home and side yard on the South.
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The expression in appellant's brief in the last paragraph on page 6 to the effect that the father (Samuel R.
Skidmore) deeded an extra strip to his son to extend
"to the center of this drivew.ay" is a misstatement of fact.
The Senior Skidmore gave the son Randolph two deeds.
The first calls for a frontage on Ninth East of 25 feet
commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 4. The second one on the same date as the de·ed to the daughter,
Mrs. May Pickering, calls for a front.age of 114 feet
on Ninth East beginning at a point 25 feet South of the
N orthwe~st corner of Lot 4. This same type of confusion
permeates appellant's statement of facts.
The statement in the last p:aragraph on page 7 of
appellant's brief to the effect that there was an accepted
property line North of appellant's property 261,4 feet
"North of the center of the driveway" and that the "center line of the driveway w.as likewise accepted and acquiesced in as the property line between appellant's and
defendant's properties until respondent built the fence
last fall" is equally reprehensible. The record shows that
the offe·r and any testimony on such a theory was expressly rejected by the tri.al court (R. 45-54).
The defendant, Minnie G. Pickering, is the second
wife of Alexander Pickering, whose first wife was May
Skidmore (Entry 12-13, Abstract of Title, Ex. 16 D and
R. 49). The relationship between the Skidmores was a
friendly one (R. 64) and the friendly relationship apparently continued between the parties in the inst.ant action
until one of Mrs. Rippentrop's tenants received a letter
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warning thein against using the driveway (R. 105 ). Two
girls, tenants of ~Irs. Rippentrop, precipitated the feeling between plaintiff and defendant in recent years (R.
98-99, 102-103).
'Vhen plaintiff's case in chief was concluded there
was no evidence before the court to indicate where the
driveway was with respect to the theoretical description
of the properties claimed by the respective parties.
Counsel for appellant indicated the contention that
plaintiff was entitled to recover "regardless of whether
it is located on our property or on the property of Mrs.
Pickering" (R. 106-108).
At the close of all of the testimony the trial court
made the following observation:
The case originally started out, according to
the blueprint given this Court, or this division of
the Court by the pretrial order, as an action only
to establish a right-of-way. The facts show that
originally all of the land was owned by Mrs.
Wilde's grandfather, Samuel R. Skidmore. From
Exhibit 2-P, which shows the Rippentrop home,
I will conclude that, at that time, the son used
his father's land. If this is a driveway to the
south of the house, there certainly was no hostility between father and son for the use of the
father's land. Mrs. Wilde's testimony shows a
friendly relationship; the former Mrs. Pickering
was her Aunt Mae. They visited betwe·en families.
She came frequently, she said. The title to the
Rippentrop home remained in Mrs. Wilde's father
until1957, when title passed to Mrs. Wilde and her
brothers by a decree of this Court. Up to the
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time of the close of plaintiff's case there was no
showing whatever of title to the ground in either
of these properties. In order to establish a rightof-way, a person must admit that the title to the
ground is in somebody else because he need not
make a claim of easement over his own ground.
He has all the elements of ownership in his own
ground. Accordingly, there was nothing before
this Court at the close orf plaintiff's case to make a
determination of easement.
Now, in this case, it seems that plaintiff is beyond
the pleadings, beyond the pretrial order, particularly, asking the Court, not only to determine the
boundary line by acquiescence, but to create an entirely new estate-a tenancy in common-between
these parties on an area between the houses, undefined as to width or as to length, and to establish as a tenancy-in-common such an area. This
Court thinks that even with the many patches
on Joseph's coat, that we should not put-attempt
to put a patch on as is asked in this case, of establishing a new property interest, a tenancy-in-common of an undefined area, by width or length, and
set it up as owned by the· present owners of the
Pickering and Rippentrop properties. (R. 130132).
Defendant in her motion for a directed verdict
asserted that there was no evidence of adverse use for
a period of twenty years or more and that Mrs. Pickering's daughter (Irene P. Schlegel) is a necessary party
(R. 127).
ARGUME·N·T
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO :SHOW THAT AN OPEN,
.A:DVERSE AND HOSTILE US:E OF THE DRIVEWAY FOR
A PERIOD OF TWENTY YEARS OR MORE.
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There must be evidence to show an adverse use before there is any presumption in that regard, as the presumption of adversity will not arise under .a mere use by
a licensee and knowledge of such use on the part of a
licensor.
In Lunt et al. v. Kitchens et al. (1953), 123 Utah 488,
260 P.2d 535, the facts are almost identical with the
facts in the instant case. In the Lwnt case defendants
claim the right of way by use for more than twenty
years. The evidence shows the two families, W eidners
and Kitchens, lived in accord and complete harmony.
There were never any objections to the use of the driveway by the Kitchens for delivery of coal and wood to the
coal shed on the East side of their property, for parking
their cars and for foot passengers. The W eidners also
used the driveway although probably to a lesser extent
since their family was smaller. This Court stated:

''In other words, the presumption of adversity
will not arise under mere use by .a licensee and
knowledge of such use on the part of the licensor.
Yeager v. Woodruff, 17 Utah 361,53 P.1045. The
use cannot be adverse when it rests upon license
or mere neighborly accommodation. Jensen v.
Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070. Sdrales v.
Rondos, 116 Utah 288,209 P.2d 562.
The failure of the W eidners to object to the use
of their property by the Kitchenses in the case .at
hand must have been beeause of an implied consent in order to accommodate their neighbors.
The use by the Kitchenses added no burden to
the driveway; they did not attempt to widen it,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
nor to interfere with the use by the Weidners.
Where a person opens the way for use of his
own premises and another uses it without interfering with the landowner's use or causing him
damage, the presumption is that the use was permissive and in absence of proof to the contrary,
the person so using it does not acquire a right
of way by prescription. Harkness v. Woodmansee (7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291) ; Cache Valley Banking
Company v. Cache County Poultry Growers Association (116 Utah 258, 209 P.2d 251. Since the
use is presumed to have been with consent in
1920, unless respondents in the present case have
presented sufficient evidence to show that it became adverse and that the claim of use against
permission was known to the W eidne:rs, the decree of the lower court must be reversed." (Emphasis added.)
In the present case, from 1882 until1946, the ground
on which the driveway is now located was used successively by the father, Samuel R. Skidmore, his son, S.
Randolph Skidmore, the daughter and sister, Mrs. May
Pickering, Guy L. Wilton, a tenant of Alexander Pickering, the husband of M.ay Pickering and Minnie G. Pickering, the respondent.
The evidence further shows that all of these parties
lived in harmony with each other, were very friendly and
had no disputes or arguments in connection with the use
of the driveway.

Savage v. Nielsen (1948), 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117,
makes the following statement:
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"It is apparent from this testimony that the
use began as permissive use and was used in
ackowledgment of a superior right and title first
in the father, Albert Savage, and later in the
brother, Gordon Savage. In short then, the facts
have put this case within the rule set out in J ensen v. Gerrard, supra, where it was said (85 Utah
481, 39 P.2d 1073) :
'A twenty-year use alone of a way is not
sufficient to establish an easement. Mere
use of a roadway opened by a landowner for
his own purposes will be presumed permissive. An antogoaistic or adverse use of a
way cannot spring from a permissive use.
A prescriptive title must be acquired adversely. It cannot be adverse when it rests
upon a license or mere neighborly accommodation. Adverse user is the anti-thesis of
permissive user. If the use is accompanied
by any recognition in express terms or by
implication of a right in the landowner to
stop such use now or at some time in the
future, the use is not adverse.' See also:
Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142,
158 p. 684."
The case of Zollimger v. Framk (19'46), 110 Utah 514,
175 P. 2d 714, cited by appellant, is distinguishable from
the case at bar. In the Zollinger case a bridge across
the irrigation ditch on the road caved in necessitating
the removal and replacement thereof. The son of the
landowner removed the broken bridge and immediately
notified Mr. Zollinger of his action. Zollinger replaced
the bridge at his own expense, which fact the Court
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points out clearly showed that Zollinger claimed an adverse right to the owner.
In the present case there is no evidence that any of
the Skidmores, including Mrs. Wilde and Mrs. May Pickering or those taking title from them, ever repaired or
made any improvements on the driveway or paid any
costs of maintaining the same.

Buckley v. Cox (1952), 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277,
states the rule covering the burden of proof as follows:
"A presumption well established in this state is
that where a person opens a way for the use of
his own premises, and another person also uses
it without causing damage, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, such use by the latter is
permissive, and not under a claim of right. J ensen v. Gerrard, supra; Savage v. Nielsen, 114
Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117; Cache Valley Banking
Co. v. Cache County Poultry Growers Ass'n, Utah
209 P.2d 251; Sdrales v. Rondos, Utah, 209 P.2d
562."
We deem it unnecessary to analyze and distinguish
the cases from other jurisdictions and the texts cited
by appellant as the cases from our own Court above fully
cover the points herein involved.
~The

pleadings in the case, pretrial order and the
evidence do not raise the question of abandonment as
argued under point II in appellant's brief. All other
facets of the argument under that point have been answered above. It is decidedly clear that appellant has
failed to prove an adverse user for a period of twenty
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years, and that the lower court was justified in granting
a motion of dismiss·al.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BE'CAUSE AN INDiiSPENSABLE PARTY IS NOT BEFORE
THE COURT.

In 1955 Irene P. Schlegel became a joint tenant with
full rights of survivorship with her mother, Minnie G.
Pickering. This made her an indispensable party to this
action. An indispensable party is defined in the case
of Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Compa'YIIJJ v. Egbert,
348 U.S. 48, 99 L. ed. 59, 75 S. Ct. 151:
"In Shields v. Barrow (US) 117 How 130, 139,
15 L ed 158, 160, indispensable parties were defined as 'Persons who not only have an interest
in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature
that a final decree cannot be made without either
affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and
good conscience.'"
Other authorities on the general subject are: Gramatan-Bulliv;an, Inc. v. Koslow (2 Cir. 1957), 240 F.2d 523,
Clacote v. TeX~as P.ac. Co:al & Oil Co. (5 Cir. 1946), 157
F.2d 216, and Keegan v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. (5
Cir.19·46), 155 F.2d 971.
CONOLIUSION
The lower court was exceedingly patient in permitting plaintiff every latitude, but of necessity and in ac-
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cordance with well-known procedural requirements called
a halt to efforts to convert the action into one orf boundary dispute, oral and self-serving statements contradicting written muniments of title and other matters beyond
the most liberal concept of the pretrial order. Plaintiff
was given every opportunity to determine title and possessory rights prior to entering into the real estate
contract with Mrs. Wilde (R. 84-85). Simple land measurements would have disclosed her South boundary
as being 261,-4 feet South of the Northwest corner of Lot
4. An inquiry could have been made of Mrs. Pickering
concerning the driveway as an incident to plaintiff's
transaction with Mrs. Wilde. Plaintiff neglected these
matters. Plaintiff was imt misled by the defendant and
there are no equities in her favor.
The evidence is not of the nature and character sufficient to deprive Mrs. Pickering of the full use and
exclusive benefit of her property. Mrs. Rippentrop cannot expect something for nothing. One cannot be lightly
deprived of full enjoyment and ownership of property
legally in his or her name. Plaintiff's coercive measures
through the instant action should fail. It must be left to
the future to determine whether on a neighborly basis
there can be some permissive use.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed
with costs to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD F. RICHARDS
GUSTIN, RlCHARDS &
M.A:T1TSSON
1007 Walker Bank Building
Attorneys for Respondent
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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